Seminar über aktuelle Fragen zur Dynamik komplexer Fluide: Bounded rational agents playing an iterated public goods game
Seminar über aktuelle Fragen zur Dynamik komplexer Fluide
- Datum: 27.11.2020
- Uhrzeit: 10:15 - 11:15
- Vortragende(r): Prakhar Godara
- MPI-DS
- Ort: Max-Planck-Institut für Dynamik und Selbstorganisation (MPIDS)
- Raum: Video conference at www.zoom.us, Meeting ID: 980 3913 9623, Passcode: 050762
- Gastgeber: DCF
- Kontakt: stephan.herminghaus@ds.mpg.de
Conventional game theory relies on the common knowledge of rationality to evaluate the Nash equilibrium. In real applications this assumption is not always true – e.g., humans playing iterated games. In this work we develop an agent based model for behavior in an iterated public goods game (PGG) by making use of bounded rationality. We introduce our model and also fit it to available experimental data. We show how purely selfish agents end up cooperating.